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The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox of  
Public Litigation 
 
Samuel Issacharoff* 
D. Theodore Rave∗∗ 
ABSTRACT 
The streamlined administrative program that BP set up to pay 
claims arising out of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill—the Gulf 
Coast Claims Facility (GCCF)—promised a significant transaction-
cost savings over litigation in the public court system. At least in 
theory, that savings should have worked to the benefit of BP and 
claimants alike, freeing up money to fund claimants’ recoveries that 
otherwise would have gone to lawyers and other litigation costs. But 
a comparison of the GCCF to the class action settlement that 
replaced it reveals that the class settlement will result in greater 
payments to claimants. Paradoxically, the dispute resolution system 
with the higher built-in transaction costs appears to offer the parties 
a superior result. This Article offers some hypotheses for why this 
might be the case. The central claim is that claimants did better 
under the higher-cost class action settlement because it allowed 
them to offer the defendant something it valued—a greater degree of 
finality than the GCCF could ever provide—in exchange for a 
“peace premium.” And this Article analyzes some of the features of 
the public system of class action litigation that enable parties to 
obtain a greater degree of closure than a purely private dispute 
resolution system like the GCCF, while at the same time providing 
guarantees of transparency, consistency, and equitable treatment of 
absentees. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
After the Deepwater Horizon oil spill,1 BP did something 
remarkable. It voluntarily (well, with a little prodding from 
President Obama2) set up an administrative program, the Gulf Coast 
Claims Facility (GCCF),3 that aimed to fully compensate all of the 
victims of the spill. The GCCF’s funding was uncapped. BP brought 
in the nation’s preeminent independent claims administrator, 
Kenneth Feinberg, to run the program, free from BP’s interference. 
BP paid all of the expenses. And it backed up all of this by setting 
aside $20 billion in a trust fund, with an open-ended commitment 
should that amount prove insufficient.4  
In theory, the GCCF should have resolved the private claims 
against BP in a streamlined and efficient manner. As envisioned 
under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA),5 the GCCF operated as a 
private dispute resolution process that would offer swift recompense 
in an informal administrative setting, allowing both claimants and 
BP to realize savings over traditional litigation. This settlement 
structure under OPA, again at least in theory, should have been the 
best of all worlds.  
To make sure that compensation reaches victims without undue 
delay after an oil discharge, OPA makes the primary “responsible 
party,” designated by the Coast Guard, strictly liable for all cleanup 
costs and resulting economic harms and only later allows that party 
to seek contribution from other potential wrongdoers in subsequent 
proceedings.6 The statute requires the responsible party to set up and 
publicize a procedure for expeditiously settling and paying claims—
including claims for interim, short-term damages—presented by 
                                                                                                             
 1. For a dramatic account of the events leading to the explosion and sinking 
of the Deepwater Horizon oil drilling rig, see JOHN KONRAD & TOM SCHRODER, 
FIRE ON THE HORIZON (2011). 
 2. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Nation on the 
BP Oil Spill (June 15, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill. 
 3. See BDO CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST 
CLAIMS FACILITY REPORT OF FINDINGS & OBSERVATIONS TO THE U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, app. ex. L (Gulf Coast Claims Facility Protocol for 
Emergency Advance Payments) (June 5, 2012), available at http://www.justice 
.gov/iso/opa/resources/66520126611210351178.pdf [hereinafter DOJ AUDIT]. 
 4. Press Release, The White House, FACT SHEET: Claims and Escrow 
(June 16, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-
sheet-claims-and-escrow. 
 5. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2712−13 (2006). 
 6. Id. § 2702(a), (d)(1)(B). See also id. §§ 2709, 2715; In re Oil Spill by the 
Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 808 F. Supp. 
2d 943, 959 (E.D. La. 2011). 
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individuals or businesses injured by the spill.7 And the statute 
channels claims into this form of private dispute resolution by 
prohibiting claimants from suing in court without first exhausting 
the responsible party’s administrative claims process.8 
Though the statutory text provides next to no guidance on what 
the responsible party’s claims process should look like, the intent of 
this scheme is clear: to promote settlement and discourage 
litigation.9 OPA was born out of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in 
Prince William Sound, Alaska, and Congress sought to avoid the 
anguishing delays and protracted legal battles that followed that and 
other spills. The Exxon Valdez spill showed that beyond the 
immediate effects on the environment, a serious oil spill had the 
capacity to impede maritime and fishing activity. For many 
communities, such a disruption would have ripple effects into the 
attendant support economy, resulting in a wide-scale economic 
slowdown reaching well beyond those suffering the immediate 
contact with the spilled oil. OPA was intended to prevent a 
downward economic cascade by bringing a quick infusion of cash to 
the afflicted community. Accordingly, it reflects a congressional 
preference for informal private dispute resolution over litigation in 
the public court system. OPA’s legislative history is replete with 
statements that the “system of liability and compensation” it creates 
“is intended to allow for quick and complete payment of reasonable 
claims without resort to cumbersome litigation.”10 
The GCCF was a manifestation of this statutory aim to 
streamline the process of recovery, though it went far beyond 
anything the statute actually anticipated. OPA simply was not 
designed to deal with a disaster of the scale or complexity of the 
Deepwater Horizon spill, as evidenced by its almost quaint $75 
                                                                                                             
 7. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2705(a), 2714 (2006). 
 8. Id. § 2713. See also In re Oil Spill, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 959, 964. 
 9. See In re Oil Spill, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 959 (“The intent is to encourage 
settlement and reduce the need for litigation.”); Johnson v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 
830 F. Supp. 309, 310 (E.D. Va. 1993) (“The purpose of the claim presentation 
procedure is to promote settlement and avoid litigation. Congress believed that 
lawsuits against parties are appropriate only ‘where attempts to reach a settlement 
with the responsible party . . . were unsuccessful.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 242, at 
66 (1989))). 
 10. 135 CONG. REC. H7954-02, at H7965, 1989 WL 187822 (Nov. 2, 1989) 
(statement of Rep. Hammerschmidt). See also id. at H7962 (statement of Rep. 
Lent) (“The thrust of this legislation is to eliminate, to the extent possible, the need 
for an injured person to seek recourse through the litigation process, which—as we 
all know—can take years.”); S. REP. NO. 101-99, at 25 (1990) (“It is the intent of 
the Committee that claims should be expeditiously paid whenever possible, and 
that claimants should not be left with the courts as their only recourse . . . .”). 
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million limit on liability, which BP waived.11 Ambitiously, the 
GCCF set out to expeditiously resolve all of the private oil spill 
related claims against BP outside of the court system. The 
combination of strict liability and a simplified claims procedure 
should have permitted claimants to proceed on their own, without 
the need for costly counsel. BP too could avoid the travails and costs 
of the court system.12 And, in fact, through its streamlined 
procedures, the GCCF paid out an eye-opening $6.2 billion to more 
than 220,000 claimants in just 18 months of operation.13 Contrast 
this with the decades of costly litigation that followed the Exxon 
Valdez spill. What more could anyone possibly want? 
The easy answer might be that lawyers, being lawyers, would 
find the lack of attorney involvement in the system suspect, both in 
theory and because it cost them business. And certainly there were 
plenty of lawsuits filed against BP, despite the availability of the 
GCCF, mostly on behalf of individuals or groups of clients, some on 
behalf of state and local governmental entities, along with a 
sprinkling of putative class actions thrown into the mix. Those 
lawsuits were consolidated in a multidistrict litigation (MDL) in 
front of Judge Carl Barbier in the Eastern District of Louisiana, 
either through the MDL pretrial transfer process or directly as venue 
transfers within the federal court system.14 The consolidated action 
included hundreds of cases and thousands of individual claimants.15 
                                                                                                             
 11. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (2006). Even OPA’s back-up, government-created 
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund for compensating claimants when the responsible 
party is unable was grossly inadequate at only $1 billion. See 26 U.S.C. § 9509 
(2006). 
 12. See, e.g., Byron G. Stier, The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as Quasi-Public 
Fund: Transparency and Independence in Claim Administrator Compensation, 30 
MISS. C. L. REV. 255, 256 (2011). 
 13. BDO CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST 
CLAIMS FACILITY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (Apr. 19, 2012), available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/697201241917226179477.pdf. 
 14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006) (allowing the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation to transfer related claims to a single district court for pretrial purposes); 
id. § 1404 (allowing one district court to transfer venue to another for convenience 
of parties); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of 
Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2010) (centralizing 
claims for pretrial purposes in Eastern District of Louisiana); In re Complaint and 
Petition of Triton Asset Leasing GmbH, No. 10-cv-1721 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2010) 
(Docket Entry 207) (transferring venue of maritime Limitation Act claim from 
Southern District of Texas to Eastern District of Louisiana); In re Oil Spill by the 
Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 
2179 (E.D. La. Aug. 24, 2010) (Document No. 62) (consolidating transferred 
limitation action with MDL proceedings). 
 15. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., 
on Apr. 20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 900 (E.D. La. 2012). 
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The MDL proceedings were complex and costly, involving a web of 
defendants and third parties, overlapping bodies of law, scores of 
expert reports, hundreds of depositions, and more than 90 million 
pages of discovery documents.16 
However, the challenge of the aftermath of the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster reveals something more fundamental about the 
multifaceted objectives of this kind of mass litigation. These mass 
harms take on the quality of public law litigation,17 even if played 
out in thousands of claims for private recompense. The problem in 
these mass cases is “what do to about the manifestly public 
dimension of such private law disputes,”18 even disregarding the 
actual public litigation against BP brought by the federal 
government and state and local public entities. In such polycentric 
disputes,19 the task is not only to resolve the multiple individual 
claims but to provide a coordination mechanism that can bring 
finality to the dispute. 
The history of the GCCF and the continuing litigation well 
illustrate this point.  The GCCF was most successful in realizing the 
OPA objective of finding a quick payment structure designed to 
limit the dislocations experienced after the Exxon Valdez spill.  To 
its great credit, the GCCF achieved one of OPA’s primary statutory 
objectives by quickly restoring billions of dollars into the crippled 
Gulf economy. And BP’s very public commitment to rapidly 
distribute payments through the GCCF may have alleviated some of 
the immediate political pressure it faced in the wake of the spill.  
But the incompleteness of this model of quick private resolution 
soon became apparent to all. 
As the claims by numerous private and public parties were 
heading to trial, BP decided to shift strategies away from the GCCF 
model. Instead of the one-by-one offer and acceptance model of the 
GCCF, BP and the private lawyers organized as the Plaintiffs’ 
Steering Committee in the MDL proceeding reached an agreement 
on a plan to settle the economic and property damage claims, as well 
as claims for medical injury for individuals who were not on the 
Deepwater Horizon drilling platform (e.g., clean-up workers 
exposed to oil or chemical dispersants) on a comprehensive basis. 
The parties negotiated two class action settlements that, after notice 
                                                                                                             
 16. Id. at 901. 
 17. The term is taken from the seminal article, Abram Chayes, The Role of the 
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282−83 (1976). 
 18. Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. 
REV. 183, 205 (2008). 
 19. This term for broad-scale disputes with multiple interested parties draws 
from Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 
394−405 (1978). 
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to class members and court approval, replaced the GCCF with a 
court-supervised claims resolution facility that, like the GCCF, also 
aimed to fully compensate victims of the spill. Unlike the GCCF, 
however, the class settlements were premised on the participation of 
lawyers, both in their creation and implementation. And those 
lawyers would have to be paid. 
Although the overall administrative cost of the GCCF is not 
publicly available, it is certainly likely that the public litigation 
system was more costly in this case in the sense of having higher 
built-in transaction costs.20 The class action settlements include a 
reserve fund of $600 million that can be awarded as fees by the 
court to private counsel, not to mention the costs of notice to the 
class and the formalities and discovery procedures of litigation in 
federal court.21 And both the class resolution and BP’s voluntary 
efforts with the GCCF reached the same end result—an 
administrative claims resolution facility to provide compensation to 
victims without a trial. Indeed, the class settlement prompted 
accusations that “class counsel becomes unimaginably wealthy . . . 
and the class gets nothing they wouldn’t have had before.”22 
But by all appearances, claimants will be receiving higher 
payments under the class settlement than under the GCCF, and in 
some cases much higher payments. Paradoxically, the dispute 
resolution system with the higher transaction costs—the class 
action—appears superior in terms of what was achieved for the 
claimant population. For the purposes of this Article, we will 
assume that this is the case across the board, and we will offer some 
examples to show the significance of the increased payments 
available under the class settlements compared with the GCCF. 
                                                                                                             
 20. See, e.g., Stier, supra note 12, at 256. 
 21. Deepwater Horizon Economic and Property Damages Settlement 
Agreement as Amended on May 2, 2012 § 14.1 ex. 27 para. 2, In re Oil Spill by 
the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL 
No. 2179 (E.D. La. May 3, 2012) [hereinafter Class Settlement Agreement], 
available at http://www.deepwaterhorizonsettlements.com/Economic/Settlement 
Agreement.aspx (follow “Amended Settlement Agreement” hyperlink). See also 
In re Aqua Dots Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 752 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting the 
greater transaction costs of class action litigation in the form of attorneys’ fees and 
cost of notice and suggesting that a representative who proposes to incur these 
costs when a defendant has already set up a voluntary compensation program is 
not adequately protecting the class’s interests under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23). 
 22. Memorandum in Support of Objections to the Economic and Property 
Damages Settlement by Objectors Hunter Armour and Judith Armour at 2, In re 
Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 
2010, MDL No. 2179, 10-cv-7777 (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2012) (Document No. 86). 
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We then devote our primary attention to what appears 
paradoxical. Presumably in an exchange between two parties, the 
lower the transaction costs, the greater the joint welfare of the 
parties. In turn, economic theory would predict that lowering 
transaction costs would mean that both parties could profit from a 
mutually beneficial distribution of the surplus.23 Assuming that the 
ensuing bargain would result in a shared distribution of this 
newfound surplus, then all parties should be better off in a system 
with lowered transaction costs. This is not a complicated insight. 
Anytime two parties must divide a fixed sum, say $100, they will 
optimize their joint welfare if they can share the entire $100. By 
extension, any transaction costs incurred by the parties in resolving 
the distribution—such as payments to lawyers to negotiate or 
litigate—reduces their joint welfare. Basically, every penny paid to 
outside parties in determining the distribution comes out of that 
$100. The lower the transaction costs, the greater the resources for 
the parties to attend to their joint needs. Because claimants will be 
paid from the pot of money held by BP, it would seem that they 
would share with BP a desire to minimize transaction costs. 
The apparent paradox is that the higher cost system in the BP oil 
spill controversy seems to have worked exactly to the contrary. 
Rather than the transaction costs reducing the claimants’ eventual 
recoveries, the class settlement appears to have resulted in greater 
recoveries for those affected by the oil spill. 
We offer some hypotheses for why this might have been the 
case. Our central argument is that the claimants did better under the 
class action settlement because it allowed them to offer BP 
something it valued—a greater degree of finality than the GCCF 
could ever provide—in exchange for a “peace premium.” At this 
level, the higher cost system almost appears to offer a win-win for 
claimants and BP. Additionally, other features of the public system 
of class action litigation, including guarantees of transparency, 
consistent treatment of similar claims, and the ability to bind 
absentees who do not affirmatively opt out, improved the efficacy of 
the settlement structure in terms of achieving closure and aided in 
satisfying the equitable concerns of the court in binding absent class 
members. 
                                                                                                             
 23. For an extreme and unfortunate application of this economic logic in legal 
doctrine, see Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991). 
There, Justice Blackmun reasoned that, ex ante, passengers injured in a cruise ship 
accident could only benefit from a forum selection clause favoring the carrier, on 
the grounds that the lower costs of legal accountability would surely be passed on 
to the consumers of the services in terms of lower prices. Id. The Court did not 
explain whether the logic of that position would hold as well to the elimination of 
all tort liability. 
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II. COMPARING PERFORMANCE: THE CLASS ACTION AND THE GCCF 
We start by offering some examples of the ways in which the 
class action settlement provided claimants with greater 
compensation than they would have received from the GCCF. Our 
attention here is on the class settlement for economic claims because 
this allows a direct apples-to-apples comparison.24 This is not meant 
to be a comprehensive comparison of the two programs. Rather, it is 
an illustration of how claimants fared in some major categories of 
relief under both approaches. In at least four important ways—
higher damages multipliers, more flexibility in past economic loss 
calculations, huge sums devoted to the seafood industry, and 
payments for additional types of property damages claims—the 
class settlement favorably compares to the GCCF. 
A. Risk Transfer Premium Multipliers 
Neither the GCCF nor the class action settlement limited 
compensation only to past economic losses stemming from the oil 
spill. Both programs also paid damages multipliers to account for 
the risk of oil coming back, potential future economic losses, and 
other unknowns.25 And both sought to compensate claimants for the 
prospect of punitive damages awards that BP would face at trial 
should cases not settle. The GCCF called these multipliers “Future 
Recovery Factors;”26 the class settlement called them “risk transfer 
                                                                                                             
 24. The benefits of the medical claims settlement include long-term 
monitoring, the opening of health resource facilities in the Gulf Coast region, and 
other mechanisms for health provision unlike anything anticipated in the GCCF 
process, which necessarily focused on efforts to resolve individual claims. See 
Deepwater Horizon Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement as Amended on 
May 1, 2012 §§ VII(B), IX(A), In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater 
Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. 2012), 
available at www.deepwaterhorizonsettlements.com/Documents/Medical%20SA 
/Medical_Settlement_Agreement.pdf. A comparison of the medical claims class 
settlement to the GCCF would be even more one-directional in favor of the terms 
of the class action. Such a comparison would be unfair to the GCCF, which did 
not endeavor to resolve such long-term needs. 
 25. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., 
on Apr. 20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 904 (E.D. La. 2012) (“The RTP 
compensates class members for potential future losses, as well as pre-judgment 
interest, any risk of oil returning, any claims for consequential damages, 
inconvenience, aggravation, the lost value of money, compensation for emotional 
distress, liquidation of legal disputes about punitive damages, and other factors.”); 
DOJ AUDIT, supra note 3, at 38. 
 26. DOJ AUDIT, supra note 3, at 38. 
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premiums” (RTPs).27 The multipliers varied based on the category 
of claims, and of course, total compensation depended on the 
underlying loss calculation being multiplied. In practice, these 
multipliers made up a significant portion of the compensation that 
BP paid claimants in exchange for a final release. 
From the very start of the GCCF program, there was uncertainty 
about the compensation that might ultimately be recovered from BP. 
Initially, the GCCF simply paid double the demonstrated past 
economic losses for all categories of claims, except for claims 
brought by oyster harvesters and processers to which it applied a 
Future Recovery Factor of four.28 Later in its operation, the GCCF 
began paying four times past losses for crab and shrimp harvesters 
and processors, as well,29 and increased the multiplier for certain 
leaseholders of oyster beds to as high as seven.30 These multipliers 
were not, however, automatically applied to claims over $500,000; 
the total compensation for such large claims needed individual 
approval by the claims administrator, Kenneth Feinberg.31 We will 
return to the question of the variability over time of the recoveries, 
and the incentives that this fluctuation created for holdouts. For 
now, we address only the amounts at stake, not the strategic 
consequences of the lack of fixed payments. 
In contrast to the GCCF, the class settlement was transparent 
and fixed on its payment schedule, again a point to which we will 
return. Of present concern, the class settlement risk transfer 
premiums were not only more finely grained, but in almost every 
category of claims, the class settlement was more generous—in 
some cases, much more generous. And, unlike the GCCF, there was 
no limit on the size of claims to which the risk transfer premiums 
would be applied. Figure 1 compares the effective multipliers paid 
by the GCCF and the class settlement for different categories of 
claims. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 27. Class Settlement Agreement, supra note 21, ex. 15. Under the class 
settlement, RTPs are applied and paid on top of demonstrated past losses. That is, 
if a business lost $10,000 because of the spill and had an RTP of two, it would 
receive $30,000 because the demonstrated loss would be multiplied by two, and 
the resulting $20,000 would be added to the original $10,000. Thus, an RTP of 
two (e.g., for tourism claims in Zones B and C) would translate to an effective 
multiplier of three. 
 28. DOJ AUDIT, supra note 3, at 38. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 38 n.24. 
 31. Id. at 43 n.34. 
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Figure 1: Loss Compensation Multipliers Under GCCF and Class 
Settlement32 
Take tourism, for example, because tourism claims made up a 
significant portion of compensable claims under both programs. The 
class settlement risk transfer premiums substantially increased total 
compensation for tourism claims.  Under the class settlement, these 
claims were paid between 12.5% and 75% more than the GCCF 
would have paid depending on the tourism business’s location.33 
And in many seafood categories, claimants were overwhelmingly 
better off under the class settlement’s risk transfer premium 
                                                                                                             
 32. This chart is derived from data in the DOJ AUDIT, supra note 3, at 38−39 
and Exhibit 15 of the Class Settlement Agreement, supra note 21. The multipliers 
for the class settlement reflect total compensation of ((1 + RTP) times economic 
loss). 
 33. The class settlement grouped claimants into geographical zones (A, B, C, 
and D) based on their proximity to the parts of the Gulf Coast most severely 
impacted by the spill. Zone A included the hardest hit areas of coastline. Zone B 
included some coastline and proximate areas. Zone C consisted primarily of areas 
just inland of Zones A and B, still relatively close to the coast. Zone D included 
areas in Gulf Coast states more distant from the shoreline. See Class Settlement 
Agreement, supra note 21, exs. 1A, 1B. 
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framework, with up to 250% increases over what the GCCF would 
have paid.34  
These are potentially huge increases in compensation. Even if 
the underlying loss calculation proved less generous in the class 
settlement than the GCCF (and there is no indication that it did, in 
fact quite the contrary35), the increase in the damages multiplier 
would still result in substantially more compensation for most 
claimants. 
B. Choice of Comparison Intervals for Calculating Economic Loss 
Any analysis of the damages multiplier under the two claims-
resolution systems is necessarily incomplete without an analysis of 
the multiplicand. In addition to more generous damages multipliers, 
the class action settlement calculated past economic losses 
differently from the GCCF. Both programs began their computation 
of past economic losses (which would then be used as a base for the 
damages multiplier in determining total compensation) by 
comparing income after the spill with income in a defined 
benchmark period before the spill, but the class settlement gave 
claimants more flexibility. The key difference was the length of the 
comparison period.  
The GCCF compared a business claimant’s revenue for the 
remainder of the calendar year following the spill (from April 20, 
2010, through December 31, 2010) with the claimant’s revenue in a 
benchmark period consisting of those same eight months in the 
claimant’s best year out of 2008, 2009, or projected 2010.36 The 
result was then adjusted to account for expenses avoided as a result 
of diminished business activity, among other factors.37 So, for 
example, a fisherman who was unable to fish in contaminated 
waters would have an offset for fuel and other expenditures that 
would normally accompany the economic activity. 
The class settlement, on the other hand, allowed claimants to 
select a comparison interval as short as three months (or as long as 
eight months). That is, claimants could choose income from any 
three consecutive months between May and December of 2010 to 
compare with income in a benchmark period of the same three 
                                                                                                             
 34. The only category in which the GCCF would appear to pay more than the 
class settlement is represented by the last bars on the right. This is for businesses 
in areas that are not adjacent to the Gulf and that were not connected to tourism or 
seafood. 
 35. See infra Part II.B. 
 36. DOJ AUDIT, supra note 3, at 42–43. See also id. ex. R para. III.4.a. 
 37. Id. at 42–43. 
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months in 2009, average of 2008–2009, or average of 2007–2009.38 
This flexibility to choose a shorter comparison interval let claimants 
take advantage of the natural variability in revenue and expenses 
over the course of a year.39 Claimants could choose a three-month 
period in which their income was particularly bad in 2010 or 
particularly good in the benchmark period and exclude from the 
calculation other months in which their 2010 income might actually 
have been quite good. Indeed, even claimants who had a better year 
following the oil spill could still obtain compensation under the 
class settlement based on a few bad months.40 
An example will help illustrate. Figure 2 shows retail sales data 
for Benton County, Mississippi, broken down into three-month 
rolling averages for the comparison and benchmark years. This 
particular illustration was presented at the fairness hearing on the 
class settlement by Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.—which was 
not a party to the settlement—in order to bolster its objection that 
the settlement was too generous and that Halliburton should not be 
held liable for contribution to the actual payments to the class. 
Under the Halliburton study, industry-wide data is used as a stand-in 
                                                                                                             
 38. Class Settlement Agreement, supra note 21, ex. 4C. 
 39. BP has argued that this was not the intent of the class settlement in all 
cases, particularly for businesses with high variability in revenue and expense 
realization. The settlement claims administrator, Patrick Juneau, and the district 
court rejected BP’s argument. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” 
in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Mar. 5, 2013) 
(Document No. 8812), available at http://www.deepwaterhorizoneconomic 
settlement.com/docs.php (follow “Review of Issue From Panel (Matching of 
Revenue and Expenses) (March 5, 2013)” hyperlink) (“Notably the Benchmark 
and Comparison Periods must be a minimum of three months. This demonstrates 
that the parties anticipated that too short a snapshot could create ‘anomalies,’ and 
the three-month minimum was the agreed-upon method for controlling for such 
anomalies.”). In two separate orders so far, the Fifth Circuit has remanded the 
issue to Judge Barbier to determine how profits are calculated in light of when 
expenses are realized, In re Deepwater Horizon, 732 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2013), and 
subsequently to determine “those who experienced actual injury traceable to loss 
from the Deepwater Horizon accident,” In re Deepwater Horizon, Nos. 13-30315, 
13-30329 (5th Cir. Dec. 2, 2013) (Document No. 122).  The center of gravity of 
the dispute has been over the proper interpretation of the terms “revenue” and 
“expenses”—essentially whether the terms should be understood on a cash or 
accrual basis.  However this issue is ultimately resolved will not change the fact 
that the class settlement’s shorter comparison interval gives claimants more 
flexibility to take advantage of fluctuations in revenue and expenses than the 
GCCF’s longer comparison interval. 
 40. Declaration of Marc Vellrath Regarding the Proposed Economic & 
Property Damages Settlement Agreement para. 140, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig 
“Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 10-
cv-7777 (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2012) (Document No. 91-2) [hereinafter Vellrath 
Declaration]. 
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for an actual retail claimant who would fit the “tourism” business 
definition under the class settlement, but it is not difficult to imagine 
claimants that had the same revenue patterns as the industry as a 
whole.41 Retail sales in Benton County for 2010, the year following 
the spill, were actually about 32% higher than sales in 2009, but 
November and December of 2010 were particularly bad months, 
with sharp decreases from November and December in previous 
years.42 By choosing October/November/December as a comparison 
interval, a claimant with Benton County’s revenue pattern could 
recover under the class settlement, even though it would not have 
been able to recover with the GCCF’s eight-month interval. 
Figure 2: Average Retail Sales for Three-Month Benchmark 
Periods for Benton County, Mississippi (in thousands)43 
The flexibility to choose a shorter comparison interval under the 
class settlement allowed claimants to exploit short-term variability 
in their income streams. This is essentially the inverse of the law of 
large numbers. Fluctuations in revenue and expenses are more likely 
to even out over an eight-month period than over a three-month 
period. By allowing claimants to choose a three-month comparison 
period to calculate economic loss, the class settlement allowed them 
                                                                                                             
 41. See id. paras. 138−39. 
 42. Id. para. 141. 
 43. This chart is derived from data in the Vellrath Declaration, supra note 40, 
para. 141 based on retail sales data for Benton County obtained from the 
Mississippi Department of Revenue. 
410 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
to take the maximum advantage of that variability, while the 
GCCF’s formula compares revenue and expense information that 
has been smoothed out over an eight-month period. 
C. Seafood Compensation Program 
Both the GCCF and the class settlement provided greater 
compensation to seafood claimants than to most other types of 
claimants. The reason is not difficult to discern, as the oiled waters 
of the Gulf were the most notorious manifestation of the 
environmental damage caused by the Deepwater Horizon explosion. 
Indeed, the image of the oil slick spreading as BP tried desperately 
to cap the gushing well riveted the nation and brought the Gulf’s 
seafood industry to a grinding halt. But the seafood compensation 
program under the class settlement was extraordinarily generous, 
with guaranteed payments that exceeded the annual revenue of the 
entire Gulf seafood industry many times over. 
Greater compensation for the seafood industry was inevitable 
under any settlement program. The public attention to the 
compromised fisheries meant that causation and proof of harm for 
seafood claims would be most easily established in any trial and 
would be the most likely source of punitive damages against the 
responsible parties. Although the GCCF treated seafood claims 
similarly to other economic loss claims, it provided additional 
compensation by offering the compromised fishing industry higher 
damages multipliers. The GCCF paid four times the demonstrable 
losses for most seafood claims and up to seven times the 
demonstrable losses for oyster bed leaseholders. And its funding 
was uncapped. 
The class settlement, on the other hand, had a separate seafood 
compensation program that, as discussed above, applied greater 
damages multipliers than the GCCF (ranging from 3.25 to 9.75).44 
And compensation under the seafood program was set at a fixed 
amount of $2.3 billion. This fixed fund is a departure from the 
structure of the GCCF and of the rest of the class settlement 
program; it sets not only a guaranteed payment but a cap on 
damages as well. But do not be fooled by the cap. As Figure 3 
shows, the capped $2.3 billion fund is approximately five times the 
total annual revenue (not lost profits) of the entire Gulf seafood 
industry.45 
                                                                                                             
 44. See supra Part II.A. 
 45. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of 
Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 909 (E.D. La. 2012) (“The 
guaranteed total of $2.3 billion allocated to the SCP represents approximately five 
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Figure 3: Class Settlement Seafood Compensation Program 
Payments Versus Total Annual Gulf Seafood Revenues (in 
millions)46 
 
 
This fund greatly exceeded the expected payments under the 
class settlement’s (already generous) compensation formula, which 
were projected to be approximately $1.9 billion.47 And the $400 
million left over would not revert back to BP. Instead, it would be 
paid out to class members pro rata in a second round distribution. 
So, the entire $2.3 billion fund is guaranteed to be paid out to 
                                                                                                             
 
times the annual average industry gross revenue for 2007 to 2009 of the Seafood 
industry in the region covered by the Settlement Agreement. $2.3 billion also 
represents 19.2 times lost industry revenue in 2010, according to the evidence 
provided.”). 
 46. This chart is derived from Gulf seafood revenue data from NOAA ALS in 
the Class Presentation PowerPoint presented in court at the hearing on preliminary 
approval of the class settlement, Hearing on Preliminary Approval at the United 
States District Court for Eastern District of Louisiana 28−30, available at 
http://www.cossichlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/class-presentation.pdf, 
and Exhibit 10 of the Class Settlement Agreement, supra note 21. Seafood 
revenue data excludes landings of menhaden, which were excluded from the 
settlement program. 
 47. In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d, at 908–09. See also Vellrath Declaration, 
supra note 40, paras. 231−32. 
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claimants—above and beyond their demonstrable losses and 
damages multipliers.48 Even capped, the class settlement’s seafood 
compensation program put far more money on the table for seafood 
claimants than the GCCF. 
D. Additional Types of Claims Paid 
Finally, the class settlement paid some categories of claims that 
the GCCF did not. For example, the class settlement provided 
compensation for (1) the loss of use and enjoyment of coastal real 
property, (2) physical damage to property caused by cleanup 
operations, and (3) losses on the sale of residential property.49 The 
GCCF did not pay any of these types of claims. 
Overall, the class settlement appeared so generous that it created 
the unusual situation in which many of the objectors to its approval 
were non-class members trying to get into the class.50 In addition, 
Halliburton, one of BP’s codefendants that was not a party to the 
settlement agreement, interposed a lengthy objection (complete with 
an economist’s 200+ page expert report) arguing that the settlement 
was paying class members too much money.51 
III. HOW COULD THE PROCESS WITH THE HIGHER TRANSACTION 
COSTS BE SUPERIOR FOR CLAIMANTS AND THE DEFENDANT? 
We start from the supposition that both sides did better—The 
claimants got more money, and the defendant got more closure—
under the public litigation system with higher transaction costs than 
                                                                                                             
 48. In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 908–09; Vellrath Declaration, supra 
note 40, para. 232. It is also worth noting that the $2.3 billion fund is not reduced 
by amounts that seafood claimants may have already received from BP through 
the GCCF as Emergency or Interim Payments because the entire remainder will be 
distributed in the second round. Vellrath Declaration, supra note 40, para. 233. 
Even claimants who took GCCF payments will receive the pro rata second round 
distribution based on the full value of their claims. In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d 
at 908–09. 
 49. Class Settlement Agreement, supra note 21, §§ 5.7−5.9, exs. 11A−13B. 
 50. See In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 922 (“This Settlement . . . is 
remarkable in that it seems to have resulted in large numbers of non-class 
members objecting to being excluded from the Settlement.”); id. at 934 (“[The 
settlement’s adequacy] is perhaps best illustrated by the extraordinary number of 
putative objectors (non-class members) who wish to be included within the 
Settlement . . . . ‘What the objections do illustrate—in vivid form—is the fact that 
this settlement is viewed as so desirable that people are clamoring to get in.’”). 
 51. See Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.’s Objections to Final Approval of 
Economic and Property Damages Class Settlement, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig 
“Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 
(Document No. 91) (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 2012); Vellrath Declaration, supra note 40. 
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in the streamlined private dispute resolution system that BP set up 
under OPA. As the prior section shows, we believe that the facts 
fully bear this out. We have been unable to find any significant 
category of recovery in which claimants did better under the GCCF 
than under the scheduled payments of the class settlement. But our 
central hypothesis is not the empirical comparison; that proof is a 
matter of record in the ongoing litigation and appeals involving BP 
and other parties to the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Rather, we 
offer an explanation as to why this may be the case, an inquiry that 
has a distinct import well beyond the BP case. It is not a question, as 
is sometimes joked about by economists, that something working 
well in practice cannot be true unless there is an accompanying 
theory. Precisely because higher recovery with higher transaction 
costs is counterintuitive, there should be some account for why this 
might be. At bottom, a claimant’s ability to obtain greater 
compensation under the class action settlement, despite its greater 
transaction costs, must reflect some factor in play that gave BP 
something it valued—and for which it was willing to pay—but 
could not get through the GCCF. We think that factor is peace. 
Below we sketch out some of the reasons why the class action 
settlement might have given all parties, including BP, a superior 
result than the GCCF and why BP might have been able and willing 
to pay more for a dispute resolution system with those features. 
A. Defendants Will Pay a Premium for Peace 
Defendants in mass litigation want peace, and they are often 
willing to pay for it. In a recent antitrust case involving multiple 
class action suits raising a variety of claims on behalf of thousands 
of claimants, the Third Circuit addressed the possibility that the 
claims had greater settlement value when they were joined together 
than they had separately: “From a practical standpoint . . . achieving 
global peace is a valid, and valuable, incentive to class action 
settlements . . . . [A defendant] may be motivated to pay class 
members a premium and achieve a global settlement in order to 
avoid additional lawsuits . . . .”52 If true, part of the explanation for 
the higher sums available through the BP class settlement than 
                                                                                                             
 52. Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 311, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, 
J., concurring). The World Trade Center Disaster Site settlement provides an 
excellent example of the peace premium. There, the defendant was willing to 
make sizable “bonus payments” to get the last 5% of plaintiffs to sign on to a 
global settlement. See In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp. 
2d 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); World Trade Center Litigation Settlement Process 
Agreement, As Amended §§ II.A, IV, VI.E, available at http://www.nysd.uscourts 
.gov/cases/show.php?db=911&id=540. 
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through the GCCF might have to do with BP’s willingness to 
sweeten the pot in exchange for greater closure. But if defendants 
are indeed willing to pay extra for a global settlement that resolves 
all claims in a single transaction instead of piecemeal serial litigation 
or settlements, we need to understand what underlies this “peace 
premium.”53 
First, and most obvious, are the lesser costs associated with 
fewer litigation or settlement transactions. Settling all of the claims 
in a single transaction allows the defendant to take advantage of 
economies of scale. Handling claims in bulk is simply more cost 
effective. The marginal cost of adding another claim to a group 
settlement is typically less than the cost of individually negotiating a 
separate settlement.54 And if an incomplete settlement leaves the 
defendant litigating against a handful of non-settling plaintiffs, there 
are fewer cases across which to spread the costs of developing 
common factual and legal issues that will arise at trial. 
Second, by settling all the claims at once, a defendant can avoid 
the risk of adverse selection. Plaintiffs (and the lawyers who 
represent groups of plaintiffs) tend to know more about the relative 
strength and value of their individual claims than the defendant, and 
if they are allowed to elect whether or not to participate in a group 
settlement, there is a danger that the plaintiffs with the strongest 
claims will opt out.55 A defendant understandably does not want to 
pay top dollar to settle a collection of weak claims only to be left 
facing the strongest claims in continued litigation. Because it must 
hold back money to litigate against the opt-outs a defendant will 
inevitably pay less per claimant to settle an incomplete aggregation 
of claims than it would pay in a truly comprehensive settlement.56  
And third, continued litigation against a handful of plaintiffs 
outside of a group settlement may impose disproportionate costs on 
a defendant. A global settlement that gives the defendant closure 
allows the defendant to eliminate contingent liabilities, put the 
dispute behind it, and focus on its business going forward. By 
contrast “continued litigation against even a handful of plaintiffs 
may result in additional negative publicity, attract unwanted 
regulatory scrutiny, and hamper access to capital markets.”57 And 
                                                                                                             
 53. For a more detailed discussion of why defendants might be willing to pay 
a peace premium see D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in 
Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1192−98 (2013). 
 54. See, e.g., Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the 
Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 761−62, 766 (1997). 
 55. Rave, supra note 53, at 1195. 
 56. Id. at 1194. 
 57. Id. at 1195. See also Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 339 n.9 (Scirica, J., concurring). 
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these costs may be greatly disproportionate to the number or value 
of remaining claims.  
Indeed, these types of concerns were particularly salient for BP. 
The oil spill was a public relations disaster for BP, and the 
company’s stock price plummeted in the aftermath of the Deepwater 
Horizon explosion, as investors sought more stable and predictable 
havens for their capital.58 Perhaps even more importantly, BP’s oil 
drilling operations in the Gulf of Mexico and elsewhere require 
federal regulatory approval.59 BP’s efforts to get emergency 
payments out through the GCCF may have helped to alleviate some 
political pressure in the short term, but additional negative publicity 
from continued litigation put those interests at risk. And even if only 
a handful of cases with a relatively small total damages exposure 
went to trial, a finding that BP was grossly negligent in any of those 
cases would adversely impact its position in still pending 
government enforcement actions under the Clean Water Act in 
which civil penalties and fines could exceed $20 billion.60 
Taken together, these three factors suggest that settlement of 
mass claims may be what economists would term a discontinuous, 
rather than continuous, function (Figures 4 and 5). The aggregation 
of claims is not simply additive. Just as class certification increases 
the litigation leverage of small value claims in a non-additive sense 
(e.g., two unviable $10 claims do not have more litigation threat 
than one $10 claim; a certain threshold of aggregation must be 
reached before any of the claims yield additional leverage), so too 
there may be compounding effects in the settlement of claims. The 
peace premium is a reflection that there may be thresholds that are 
critical to defendants. Such thresholds may include complete peace, 
the settlement of the claims held by major aggregators on the 
plaintiffs’ side,61 the specifics of regulatory compliance, or other 
potential case-specific factors. The premium comes from the 
realization of whichever threshold is of enhanced value to the 
defendant such that each individual plaintiff does not add very much 
                                                                                                             
 58. KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT 129−30 (2012). 
 59. Id. See also David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill is Gone: The Gulf of 
Mexico, Environmental Crime, and Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1416 
(2011). 
 60. See, e.g., Barry Meier & Clifford Krauss, As BP Trial Nears, Hints of 
Progress on a Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2013, at B1. 
 61. This is the best way to understand the Vioxx settlement, which paid a 
substantial price not for total peace but for peace with the law firms with credible 
litigation threats. See Settlement Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc., and the 
Counsel Listed on the Signature Pages Hereto § 1.2.8 (Nov. 9, 2007), available at 
http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents (follow “Master Settlement 
Agreement” hyperlink); see also Issacharoff, supra note 18, at 215−19 (discussing 
the Vioxx settlement). 
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to the value of the potential settlement until a sufficient number of 
claims have been aggregated. 
Figure 4: Continuous Function (No Peace Premium) 
Figure 5: Discontinuous Function (Peace Premium) 
Because of the peace premium, when many plaintiffs have 
similar claims against a common defendant, those claims are often 
worth more if they can be bundled up and sold to the defendant (i.e., 
settled) as a single package. The problem is that the rights to control 
those claims are dispersed among the individual plaintiffs, and it can 
be costly to assemble those rights into a more valuable collective. In 
other words, plaintiffs in mass litigation face an “anticommons” 
problem that can prevent them from maximizing the value of their 
claims.62  
                                                                                                             
 62. Rave, supra note 53, at 1190−1201. 
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An anticommons occurs when property rights are dispersed 
among too many owners, and transaction costs and strategic 
holdouts make assembling those rights into a more valuable whole 
difficult.63 Individual plaintiffs in mass litigation, who tend to have 
no preexisting relationship with each other, face steep transaction 
costs to assembling their claims. Worse, because continued litigation 
against a handful of plaintiffs (whatever the number below 
important thresholds might be) imposes disproportionate costs and 
risk on the defendant, strategic holdouts can threaten to deny the 
defendant peace in the hopes of extracting a side payment. Even the 
mere anticipation of such strategic behavior may cause the 
defendant to withhold the peace premium in a mass settlement.64  
In many ways, a class action settlement can be understood as a 
solution to the anticommons problem in mass litigation.65 The class 
action mechanism offers plaintiffs (or, more realistically, a lawyer 
acting on their behalf) a relatively low cost method of overcoming 
this dynamic and assembling their dispersed rights of action into a 
single package for sale to the defendant.66 A Rule 23(b)(3) class 
action, of course, allows individual plaintiffs to opt out of a class 
settlement,67 so simply using the class action machinery does not 
guarantee complete closure. But there are reasons to believe that a 
class action settlement allows plaintiffs to credibly offer the 
defendant a much greater degree of finality than it could obtain 
through one-by-one private settlements. One unanticipated defect of 
OPA’s attempt to incentivize private settlements was the inability to 
organize systematic closure, as through a class action. This proved a 
significant obstacle to a program like the GCCF, where plaintiffs 
must affirmatively opt in on an individual basis. As a result, if a 
class action settlement promises something approaching peace, the 
                                                                                                             
 63. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998). 
 64. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION 
§ 3.17 cmt. b (“Even the threat of such a holdout may cause the defendant to 
withhold the premium associated with complete peace, thereby inuring to the 
detriment of all the represented claimants.”). 
 65. Rave, supra note 53, at 1239−45. 
 66. Id. See also Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions 
Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate 
Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2144−46 (2000). 
 67. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3)(B), (e)(4). See also Philips Petroleum v. Shutts, 
472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (holding that “due process requires at a minimum that an 
absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class 
by executing and returning an ‘opt out’ or ‘request for exclusion’ form to the 
court”). 
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defendant may be willing to pay a premium over serial individual 
litigation or settlement.68  
B. The Class Settlement Offered BP More Finality 
Several features of the economic and property damages class 
action settlement made it possible for plaintiffs to offer BP a greater 
degree of finality than it could ever have hoped to achieve through 
the GCCF. These features—a walk-away provision, a firm cut-off 
date, transparent and consistent procedures, and a shift from an opt-
in model to an opt-out model—may have contributed to BP’s ability 
and willingness to pay claimants more under the class action 
settlement than through the GCCF. 
1. Walk-away Provision 
The class action settlement contained a walk-away provision 
that allowed BP to back out of the deal if too few plaintiffs 
participated. Walk-away provisions are typical in large-scale 
aggregate settlements, and they afford defendants some degree of 
protection from adverse selection and the loss of economies of scale. 
By including a walk-away provision in a settlement agreement, class 
counsel is guaranteeing the defendant at least a certain level of peace 
as a condition of settlement. If too many plaintiffs opt out, the 
defendant is not left in a situation where it has overpaid to settle a 
collection of weak claims only to face a substantial number of strong 
claims in continued litigation. Instead, the class settlement is 
nullified, and all parties continue to litigate. 
In effect, walk-away provisions allow a settling defendant a 
second option once the entirety of the settlement structure becomes 
apparent. Each offer is made with the knowledge that if settlement is 
not reached with a sufficient number (or quality) of plaintiffs, then 
the initial offers may be rescinded. This frees a settling defendant 
from having to withhold money from early settlement offers for fear 
of not getting enough claims—or the right claims—resolved. 
Particularly if the litigation has been concentrated in the hands of 
major plaintiffs’ firms, a partial settlement can be the worst of all 
worlds: The weaker claims may settle, and the proceeds from those 
                                                                                                             
 68. See Rave, supra note 53, at 1193−95 for an explanation of why a 
defendant might be willing to pay a premium even when a settlement does not 
include every single claim. 
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settlements may provide a war chest for the prosecution of the 
stronger claims.69 
Paradoxically, however, the same mechanism that gives the 
defendant a second option may also compromise the parties’ ability 
to achieve a comprehensive settlement. Walk-away provisions 
usually condition the settlement on a very high percentage of 
plaintiffs participating. A high participation threshold guarantees the 
defendant a sufficient degree of peace, but it also empowers 
strategic holdouts to threaten to derail the entire deal if they are not 
paid off. If a settlement is structured as an all-or-nothing deal, then 
any individual plaintiff is a potential holdout.70 But even where the 
participation threshold is set lower—say, 95%—it is possible for a 
lawyer to coordinate a group of plaintiffs into a holdout bloc that 
can extort side payments or a disproportionate share of the 
settlement allocation by threatening to opt out en masse.71 The 
potential for holdouts can threaten a settlement containing a walk-
away provision and, therefore, the plaintiffs’ ability to offer the 
defendant peace in exchange for a premium. 
The BP class action settlement contained an innovative 
provision to deal with this problem. The settlement allowed BP to 
walk away if too many plaintiffs opted out, but the walk-away 
threshold that the defendant and the Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee 
agreed upon was not made public. Instead, it was filed with the court 
in a sealed envelope.72 Keeping the precise threshold confidential 
made it harder for any strategic player attempting to coordinate a 
holdout bloc to know whether he had assembled enough plaintiffs 
willing to opt out in order to make a credible threat to hold up the 
deal. Once the participation threshold was reached and the 
settlement became binding, BP could be sure that it had bought at 
least a certain degree of peace. It did not risk facing hordes of opt-
outs in continued litigation. 
Nothing in the OPA claims resolution process could provide this 
second-look protection to BP. A private claims facility like the 
GCCF, structured to meet the statutory requirements for a procedure 
for claimants to present their claims to the responsible party before 
obtaining the right to sue, was necessarily an open-ended offer that 
                                                                                                             
 69. This dynamic was the downfall of the Owens Corning Fibreboard 
National Settlement Program. See, e.g., RICHARD NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A 
WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 111–12 (2007); Samuel Issacharoff, “Shocked”: Mass 
Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation after Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. 
REV. 1925, 1936−38 (2002). 
 70. See Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 
58 KAN. L. REV. 979, 981−82 (2010).  
 71. See Rave, supra note 53, at 1201. 
 72. Class Settlement Agreement, supra note 21, § 21.3.6. 
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facilitated adverse selection. Under the GCCF, BP had no advanced 
guarantee that it would achieve any degree of finality. The GCCF 
paid claims seriatim, without any assurance that later plaintiffs 
would be bound to the same procedures. BP did not know how 
many claimants would elect to participate or what percentage of 
total claims would be resolved through the GCCF’s administrative 
process at the time it began paying claims. Because the claimants 
were not bound in advance to pursue their claims through the 
GCCF, there was a clear danger that those with weak claims would 
take the settlement offers made by the GCCF and those with strong 
claims would opt for litigation instead. The rational incentive for BP 
was to hold back payments to early settlers as a means to protect 
against later-filed, stronger claims. In turn, the vulnerability of being 
gamed in this fashion created a corresponding incentive to keep the 
details of settlement criteria and settlement amounts as secret as 
possible. 
Indeed, even the GCCF’s payment structure facilitated adverse 
selection. The GCCF generally offered claimants “Final Payments” 
for all of their documented past and future losses in exchange for a 
release and covenant not to sue.73 The documentation requirements 
for Final Payments were fairly stringent. But the GCCF also allowed 
claimants to elect a one-time, fixed-sum “Quick Payment” of $5,000 
for individuals or $25,000 for businesses based on a much more 
limited documentary showing.74 Reducing the evidentiary 
requirements for small claims is not irrational; both claimants and 
BP may be quite willing to tolerate some loss of accuracy in the 
valuation of small claims in order to prevent the transaction costs of 
assembling and reviewing documentation from eating up the entire 
amount. But the availability of Quick Payments did make the GCCF 
relatively more attractive for low-value claims than for high-value 
ones. And it comes as no surprise that far more claimants accepted 
the fixed-sum offers of Quick Payments than Final Payments, with 
the strongest claims refusing to settle through the GCCF and instead 
retaining the right to sue. 
Because the GCCF did not offer BP an opportunity to back out 
of the compensation scheme if too many claimants elected not to 
participate—BP could not even know how many opt-outs there 
would be until it had already paid those who opted in—and because 
adverse selection is predictable, BP had to hold back money to 
litigate or individually settle the strongest claims that were most 
likely to opt out. In other words, BP had to withhold the peace 
premium. The walk-away provision of the class action settlement, 
                                                                                                             
 73. DOJ AUDIT, supra note 3, at 35. 
 74. Id. at 34. 
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on the other hand, reassured BP that if it was going to face a 
significant number of opt-outs in continued litigation, at least it 
would not have overpaid to settle a collection of weak claims. That 
guarantee allowed BP to commit more resources to the settlement 
that would only take effect if it reached a sufficient degree of 
finality. 
2. Firm Cut-off Date 
The class action settlement also imposed a firm cut-off date by 
which claimants had to decide whether to participate in the 
settlement program or opt out and pursue their claims against BP in 
court. If claimants did not file a request to be excluded with the 
court by the opt-out deadline, they were bound by the settlement. 
The GCCF, on the other hand, was open-ended and allowed 
plaintiffs to take a wait-and-see approach, depriving it of the ability 
to offer BP finality. Moreover, a rational claimant could assume that 
payments would go up over time because the GCCF had to pursue 
holdouts against a backdrop of prior settlement amounts. 
The GCCF further rewarded delay by allowing claimants to 
obtain compensation over an extended period of time without 
deciding whether to sue BP in court. Again, this was not necessarily 
a design flaw of the GCCF, but rather a function of OPA’s statutory 
requirement that the responsible party set up a process to pay claims 
for interim, short-term damages, without precluding later recovery 
for full damages.75 Claimants could obtain “Interim Payments” from 
the GCCF for documented past losses as often as once per quarter 
without signing a release.76 While these payments did not include a 
damages multiplier to compensate for potential future losses, they 
allowed claimants to keep going back to the well for additional 
Interim Payments over the life of the GCCF, without giving up the 
right to later sue BP. 
Interim Payments, thus, made the cost of holding out very low. 
Claimants could obtain much of the benefit of participating in the 
GCCF—compensation on an ongoing basis for past losses—without 
giving up the right to sue. A potential holdout would not have to 
forego these benefits to make a credible threat of litigation. As a 
result, BP could not make generous offers of Final Payment across 
the board because it had to hold back funds to litigate against and 
                                                                                                             
 75. 33 U.S.C. § 2705(a) (2006). 
 76. DOJ AUDIT, supra note 3, at 35. See also FEINBERG, supra note 58, at 173 
(noting that “claimant[s] could select an interim payment and take a ‘wait and see’ 
approach to the future”). 
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pay strategic claimants who took Interim Payments but would reject 
offers of Final Payment and instead threaten to litigate in court. 
By contrast, forcing claimants to choose whether to litigate or 
participate in the class action settlement by a firm deadline increased 
the cost of holding out. Strategic players would have to forego all of 
the benefits of the settlement and commit to go it alone in litigation 
in order to hold out. They could not take a wait-and-see approach. 
The predictable result is fewer holdouts and more certainty and 
finality for BP, especially when combined with the walk-away 
provision. The opt-out deadline provided a specific date by which 
BP would know whether it would obtain a satisfactory degree of 
closure through the settlement or should back out of the deal 
because of adverse selection. This certainty allowed BP to commit 
more resources to the class action settlement ex ante. 
3. Transparent and Consistent Procedures 
The class action settlement adopted transparent and consistent 
procedures to deal with all claims. The payment calculation 
methodologies were set out in full detail at the beginning of the 
settlement program and could not be modified for the program’s 
duration.77 This transparency marked a departure from the GCCF, 
which was designed to be flexible. As a result, it could not be 
transparent and frequently adjusted its procedures in response to 
changing circumstances.78 The increase in transparency and 
consistency that accompanied the shift from the GCCF to the class 
action settlement made it harder for claimants to extract greater 
payments through strategic action. 
The GCCF’s lack of transparency was a familiar refrain among 
its critics.79 The claims administrator, Kenneth Feinberg, retained 
                                                                                                             
 77. See Class Settlement Agreement, supra note 21, § 4.4.7 (“The Settlement 
Program and its Claims procedures shall be subject to the ongoing supervision of 
the Court. The criteria, documentation, proof, and [compensation amount] 
provisions of each of the Claims categories shall apply equally to all Claimants 
regardless whether they are proceeding individually, represented by others, or 
proceeding as an assignee of an individual Claim. The claims administrator shall 
explore and consider the utilization of streamlined procedures to improve the 
efficiency of the Claims process, without changing Claims criteria.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 78. See DOJ AUDIT, supra note 3, at 8−9 (“[T]he GCCF’s approach to the 
development and implementation of its protocols and methodologies was, by 
necessity, a dynamic one. The GCCF constantly made adjustments and 
improvements as it gained a greater understanding of the myriad challenges that 
emerged during its operations.”). 
 79. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast 
Claims Facility as a Means for Resolving Mass Tort Claims—A Fund Too Far, 71 
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the discretion to make changes to the GCCF’s procedures and 
claims criteria on the fly.80 Those procedures and claims criteria 
evolved throughout the GCCF’s lifespan.81 And the GCCF’s claims 
adjusters were able to exercise discretion in evaluating and 
calculating losses suffered by business claimants.82 This discretion 
and evolution in response to changing circumstances made the 
GCCF flexible, but it also facilitated strategic behavior by claimants 
and made it more difficult for BP to achieve closure. 
As a result of evolving standards under the GCCF, the efforts at 
settlement created a dynamic of serial individual negotiations 
between a single repeat-player defendant and many single-shot 
claimants faced with a collective action problem. The claimants 
would maximize the collective value of their claims if they could 
coordinate to offer the defendant peace. But if the criteria for 
determining the compensation amount are up for grabs with each 
claimant, then each claimant is a potential holdout. No individual 
claimant internalizes all of the costs of adopting an unreasonable 
negotiating strategy. The GCCF’s lack of transparency made it 
easier for strategic players to attempt to extract secret payoffs, and 
its procedural flexibility let holdouts bargain for prospective 
changes to the compensation criteria. This was not necessarily a 
failure of the GCCF; the lack of a closure strategy reflected an 
attempt to implement OPA’s statutory preference for informal one-
                                                                                                             
 
LA. L. REV. 819, 842 n.107, 881−86 (2011); George W. Conk, Diving into the 
Wreck: BP and Kenneth Feinberg’s Gulf Coast Gambit, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. 
L. REV. 137, 141 (2012); Amicus Brief of the States of Alabama, et al. in Support 
of Appellees and Affirmance of the District Court at 6−13, In re Deepwater 
Horizon, No. 13-30315 (consolidated with No. 13-30315) 2013 WL 2474803 (5th 
Cir. May 31, 2013) (summarizing complaints made to the attorneys general of 
Alabama and Mississippi and the governor of Alabama about GCCF’s lack of 
transparency and consistency). 
 80. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 58, at 163, 173 (“I did promise that the 
GCCF would continue to monitor the Gulf and reserved the right to modify the 
recovery factor, up or down, as events unfolded.”); Mullenix, supra note 79, at 
841−44. 
 81. See, e.g., DOJ AUDIT, supra note 3, at 72−76 (noting that similarly 
situated claimants were sometimes treated differently because of the evolution of 
GCCF’s methodologies). 
 82. See id. at 43, 54 (noting discretion in calculating losses). In fact, for 
business claimants with more than $500,000 in documented losses, the GCCF did 
not automatically apply the same damages multiplier for future losses but instead 
determined the final payment amount “on an individualized basis after analyzing 
input from the claimant as well as the expert.” Id. at 43 n.34. Thus, claimants with 
the largest claims and, therefore, the most credible threat to pursue individual 
litigation got the opportunity to negotiate their payments individually, outside of 
the normal protocol that applied to other claimants. 
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by-one claims resolution. But it made it impossible for claimants to 
offer BP finality with any credibility. 
In the class action settlement, by contrast, all parties made a 
credible precommitment to consistently apply the same criteria to all 
of the claims made by all claimants over the entire duration of the 
settlement program, and those criteria were set out in advance for all 
parties to see.83 This commitment to consistency and transparency 
raised the cost of holding out. Strategic players and “squeaky 
wheels” could not hope that their threats or protestations would 
cause the claims administrator secretly to offer increased payments 
to get them to go away. Nor could they lobby for prospective 
changes in the compensation criteria. The claims administrator’s 
hands were tied, and a strategic player’s only choices would be to 
take the amount dictated by the class action settlement’s terms or opt 
out and go it alone in litigation. Raising the cost of holding out 
reassured BP that the money it put into the settlement would buy it 
peace and that it would not have to hold back money to deal with an 
upward spiral where strategic players sought an ever increasing 
series of secret payments. 
The adoption of transparent and consistent procedures may have 
been motivated by the need to comply with the dictates of Rule 23 
and due process.84 But those formal requirements of the public 
system of class action litigation have a certain mast-tying effect. 
Unlike a purely private arrangement, the parties are not free to 
simply renegotiate the terms of the claims resolution scheme as the 
process unfolds. Any modifications would need to secure the 
approval of a court tasked with protecting the interests of absentees 
and ensuring that the settlement is fair and reasonable.85 Perhaps 
counterintuitively, this reduction in flexibility had the effect of 
making strategic action more difficult and therefore, making it easier 
for the plaintiffs to credibly offer BP peace in exchange for a 
premium. 
                                                                                                             
 83. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of 
Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 904 (E.D. La. 2012) (“The 
Settlement Program calculates awards using public, transparent frameworks that 
apply standardized formulas derived from generally accepted and common 
methodologies. This level of transparency permits class members to understand 
how their claims will be evaluated under the Settlement. It also ensures that 
similarly situated class members are treated similarly.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 85. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).  Indeed, the disputes in the Fifth Circuit over 
the proper damages calculation for business economic losses and causation 
illustrate this precommitment to consistent procedures.  See supra note 39 (setting 
out Fifth Circuit rulings on this issue to date). 
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4. Shift from Opt-in to Opt-out 
Finally, the class action settlement shifted from the opt-in model 
of the GCCF to an opt-out model. Under the GCCF, a claimant 
affirmatively had to file a claim, accept the offer of Quick or Final 
Payment, and execute a release in order to be bound. Claimants who 
did not take these affirmative steps were free to bring suits in court, 
at least until the statute of limitations ran. Under the class action 
settlement, by contrast, the default rule was flipped. Claimants who 
did nothing are bound by the settlement, instead of not bound. 
The shift from an opt-in rule to an opt-out rule takes advantage 
of claimants’ inertia to achieve greater finality. Why do today what 
can be put off until tomorrow? People tend to value the present more 
than the future, and it always seems rational to do more pleasant 
things today and put off less pleasant chores—Watching football 
now is always better than mowing the lawn. People procrastinate 
unless there are intervening incentive structures that affect 
behavior.86 One such behavioral trait is the propensity to conform 
behavior to default rules under conditions of uncertainty. Default 
rules tend to be “sticky,” and quite often, people do not make the 
effort—even a minimal effort like filing a request to opt out of a 
class action settlement with the court—to deviate from them.87 
Consequently, setting the default rule as participation with a right to 
opt out can be expected to achieve a greater degree of participation 
and, thus, finality than setting the rule as non-participation with a 
right to opt in. 
Note that an opt-out rule combined with a requirement that 
claimants actually file a claim in the class action settlement program 
to receive compensation could, in theory, benefit the defendant by 
reducing the total number of claims the defendant ends up paying 
                                                                                                             
 86. See, e.g., Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted 
O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral 
Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism”, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 
(2003); Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 
Q.J. ECON. 121 (2001) (discussing how procrastination may be more severe when 
pursuing important, rather than unimportant, goals). See generally CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN & RICHARD H. THALER, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
 87. See Camerer et al., supra note 86. The procedures for opting out of the 
class action settlement were straightforward, well disclosed, and far from onerous. 
Claimants who wished to be excluded from the class simply had to submit to the 
court a written and signed request to be excluded from the class by November 1, 
2012—six months after the court’s preliminary approval of the class settlement. 
See In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 937. 
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compared with a pure opt-in rule.88 But the reduction in the number 
of claims paid is not likely to be very large because those claimants 
who fail to file either a request to opt out or a claim in the class 
action settlement are unlikely to be the claimants who would have 
either opted in to a system like the GCCF or taken the much more 
onerous affirmative step of suing the defendant individually.  
The shift from an opt-in model to an opt-out model does, 
however, force claimants with high value claims and strategic 
players to identify themselves to the defendant earlier in the process. 
Instead of biding their time on the sidelines—or taking the wait-and-
see approach of filing for Interim Payments in the GCCF—under 
the class action settlement, claimants who intend to pursue 
individual litigation have to make their intentions known by the opt-
out date.  
The ability to bind absentees is the hallmark of the public class 
action litigation system. Thus, it is difficult or impossible to 
replicate an opt-out model in a private dispute resolution system as 
envisioned under OPA. Only a court’s imprimatur—and a deal that 
comports with the formalities and safeguards of the class action 
system—can bind absentees without their affirmative consent. But 
this is one of the advantages of public litigation over private 
ordering in this case. By binding claimants who do nothing and 
forcing those who wish to litigate to identify themselves, the opt-out 
feature of the class action settlement removes the potential for 
surprise and gives BP a greater degree of closure and certainty as to 
its continuing exposure. Closure and certainty are valuable 
commodities to a defendant like BP—which faced regulatory, public 
relations, and capital markets pressures—and plaintiffs could 
demand a premium for delivering them. 
C. The Shift from Private Alternative Dispute Resolution to Public 
Class Action Litigation Looked Like a Win-Win 
Taken together, these features of the class action settlement 
could give BP what it wanted—a greater degree of finality than it 
could get from the sort of private dispute resolution system 
envisioned by OPA. And the results appear to bear this out, as only 
a tiny fraction (about 1.2%) of plaintiffs opted out of the class action 
settlement.89  
                                                                                                             
 88. For a comparison of opt-in and opt-out class action structures in the 
United States and Europe, see Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will 
Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179, 204−05 (2009). 
 89. The opt-out rate for the class is derived from 13,123 timely, valid opt-out 
requests divided by the 1.2 million class notices sent. See In re Oil Spill, 910 F. 
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That finality worked to the benefit of claimants because it freed 
up more resources for BP to devote to the settlement. In essence, the 
public machinery of the class action, with its ability to bind 
absentees, requirements of transparency, and judicial assurance of 
equitable treatment, allowed the plaintiffs credibly to offer BP a 
greater degree of peace in exchange for more money. In other 
words, abandoning OPA’s streamlined, non-adversarial, private 
dispute resolution scheme for the costlier public class action 
litigation system had the ability to leave both sides better off. 
But it is also important to consider the additional leverage that 
class action aggregation gave the plaintiffs. Finality creates value for 
BP, and thus a surplus over which the parties can bargain. But it is 
the class action’s ability to coordinate the efforts of a large and 
diverse population of claimants—to credibly threaten litigation and 
prevent holdouts from siphoning off value—that allows the 
plaintiffs to effectively bargain for a portion of that surplus. 
Defendants, thus, face a paradox. They need aggregation through the 
class action system to get the finality they desire and cannot get 
through a private dispute resolution scheme, but that same 
aggregation gives plaintiffs the leverage to negotiate for a higher 
return. 
When peace is valuable enough to the defendant—as it appeared 
to be for BP—the move from a private victim compensation scheme 
to the public class action system can generate extra value that 
exceeds the accompanying increase in transaction costs (e.g., 
attorneys’ fees, notice, discovery, and agency costs). And the 
increased leverage that the class action gives the plaintiffs helps 
ensure that value is shared. In other words, the shift from the GCCF 
to the class action settlement looks like a win-win. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The paradox of public litigation begins with the dispute 
resolution system with apparently higher transaction costs proving 
more efficient and more effective in providing compensation and 
closure in the Gulf. The deeper lesson is that the public civil justice 
system and its evolved procedures worked better than a jury-rigged 
alternative crafted from strict maritime liability, the presumed 
                                                                                                             
 
Supp. 2d at 937. Even this number overstates the true number of opt-outs because 
an unknown portion of those opt-out requests were submitted by parties who were 
not members of the class, and nearly 1,800 opt-outs later revoked their requests. 
Id. at 937–38. 
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damages cap of the Limitations Act, and the quick-pay approach to 
individual-by-individual harms.  
Beyond the resolution of the Deepwater Horizon calamity lies a 
fundamental problem of how to remediate the scope of harms that 
routinely result from mass society. Our point is not to enter the 
debate over efficient deterrence and optimal compensation. Rather, 
we use the BP oil spill as a point of departure precisely because it 
was the largest environmental catastrophe in American history and 
because the scale of harm provided a critical test for the efforts to 
bypass the litigation system. Ultimately, class litigation—or more 
precisely, class settlement—provided the simplest and most 
effective way to manage the case. That lesson has significance well 
beyond the immediate events in the Gulf of Mexico, even as the 
class action remains legally problematic.  
While the class mechanism proved effective in the Deepwater 
Horizon context, the broader prospects for such class resolutions 
remain unclear. Class actions are under significant assault.90 Again 
and again in recent years, the Supreme Court has made it more 
difficult to use class action to resolve large-scale disputes arising out 
of mass injuries.91 The pullback began with Amchem Products, Inc. 
v. Windsor92 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.93 and their restrictions 
on mass tort class action settlements. From there, the Court has 
introduced heightened requirements of “commonality” of claims 
under Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes94 and has allowed mandatory 
arbitration requirements to close out class treatment of even 
identical consumer claims under AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion95 and its progeny. The result is a pressure to find 
alternative means of effectively resolving mass disputes at a 
wholesale level outside of the courtroom. Idealized individual, case-
by-case litigation in federal court is simply not a realistic option. 
Asbestos claimants and defendants have sought refuge in the 
bankruptcy code.96 Mass torts have shifted into MDLs, where 
parties must rely on non-class aggregate settlements in their quest 
                                                                                                             
 90. See, e.g., Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 729 (2013). 
 91. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in 
Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal 
Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286 (2013). 
 92. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 93. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 94. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 95. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 96. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2006); see also Troy A. McKenzie, Bankruptcy 
and the Future of Aggregate Litigation: The Past as Prologue?, 90 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 839, 842 (2013). 
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for global resolution.97 The lawyers constructing these deals must 
use innovative and controversial contractual strategies to try to 
achieve full participation by claimants, as they did in the Vioxx 
settlement.98 And judges are left to assert authority under a “quasi-
class action” theory to provide even limited supervision and 
review.99 At the same time, companies seek to bypass the litigation 
system entirely by setting up their own private alternative dispute 
resolution programs and incorporating mandatory arbitration clauses 
with class action waivers into their consumer and employment 
contracts.100 
The latest such innovations are private claims facilities, modeled 
largely on the September 11 Victims Compensation Fund.101 
Defendants set up these private compensation or refund programs in 
attempts to resolve their liabilities, while avoiding the costs of the 
public litigation system. Instead of waiting to be sued, they craft 
streamlined, non-adversarial administrative schemes where victims 
of mass harms can obtain compensation without the need to file 
lawsuits or hire lawyers. 
                                                                                                             
 97. See, e.g., Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to 
Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation after Ortiz, 58 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 775 (2010). 
 98. For competing takes on the Vioxx settlement’s strategy for achieving 
closure by requiring participating lawyers to recommend settlement to all of their 
clients and to withdraw from representing those clients who decline, see 
Issacharoff, supra note 18, and Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265 (2011). 
 99. See, e.g., In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 184, 
196 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 
558−62 (E.D. La. 2009); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. 
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 
2008), amended in part, MDL 05-1708 DWF/AJB, 2008 WL 3896006 (D. Minn. 
Aug. 21, 2008); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class 
Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 
63 VAND. L. REV. 107 (2010). 
 100. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining 
“Consumer-Friendly” Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825 (2012). 
 101. See generally FEINBERG, supra note 58 (discussing 9/11 Fund, Hokie 
Spirit Memorial Fund for victims of the 2007 Virginia Tech shooting). A private 
fund run by Feinberg is available for victims of the sexual abuse scandal at Penn 
State. See Penn State to Compensate Sandusky Victims, Erickson Says, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-19 
/penn-state-to-compensate-sandusky-victims-erickson-says.html; Penn State 
Looking to Reach Accord on Abuse Claims, USA TODAY (Feb. 23, 2013), http: 
//www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/02/23/penn-state-sandusky-lawsuits 
/1941057/. 
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Some courts have bought into the logic that when they succeed 
in lowering transaction costs, such private arrangements for 
resolving mass disputes are superior to the public system of class 
action litigation. In In re Aqua Dots Product Liability Litigation, for 
example, the Seventh Circuit went so far as to hold that a class 
cannot be certified where the defendant has already set up a lower 
cost private compensation program to offer the same relief—in that 
case, a standing offer of a full refund to anyone who purchased a toy 
that turned out to be defective.102 Judge Easterbrook explained: “A 
representative who proposes that high transaction costs (notice and 
attorneys’ fees) be incurred at the class members’ expense to obtain 
a refund that already is on offer is not adequately protecting the 
class members’ interests,” and thus no class could be certified under 
Rule 23(a)(4).103 
But other courts have cautioned that this reflexive move away 
from the class action is a mistake because no other system yet 
discovered can offer parties the finality they seek with the same 
degree of transparency, consistency, and fairness. As Judge Scirica 
observed in Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc.: “[O]utside the federal 
rules governing class actions, there is no prescribed independent 
review of the structural and substantive fairness of a settlement 
including evaluation of attorneys’ fees, potential conflicts of interest, 
and counsel’s allocation of settlement funds among class 
members.”104 
OPA showed a preference for informality with its call for a 
streamlined, non-adversarial, administrative procedure for resolving 
disputes and providing compensation for oil spill victims. By 
shedding the formalities, the inevitable delays, and the need for 
                                                                                                             
 102. 654 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 103. Id. at 752. The district court was even more explicit in its comparative 
analysis of transaction costs, finding that class certification was not appropriate 
under Rule 23(b)(3) because the class action was not “superior to other methods of 
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy,” namely the defendant’s 
voluntary refund program. In re Aqua Dots Product Liab. Litig., 270 F.R.D. 377, 
384−85 (N.D. Ill. 2010). See also In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 628 F.3d 
185, 195−96 (5th Cir. 2010) (denying class certification where transaction costs of 
class settlement—attorneys’ fees and administrative costs—would “swallow the 
entire settlement” leaving no benefit for the class over other means of adjudicating 
the dispute (quoting In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 263 F.R.D. 340, 
358 (E.D. La. 2009))). 
 104. Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 334 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J., 
concurring) (citations omitted). Similarly, Judge Barbier found that the class 
settlement was “superior to the GCCF at the very least because it is judicially 
supervised, meaning that it is a program that must meet heightened guarantees of 
consistency with due process and fairness.” In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig 
“Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mex., on Apr. 20, 2010, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 
961 (E.D. La. 2012). 
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costly legal representation that are part and parcel of the public 
litigation system, Congress hoped that OPA would lead to a 
transaction-cost savings that would work to the benefit of claimants. 
But even with a defendant like BP, able and willing to fund a 
massive private claims resolution facility and to enlist the nation’s 
preeminent claims administrator with an unquestioned reputation for 
independence, that approach has been unable to recreate the features 
of the class action that work best—the ability to provide peace in 
exchange for a premium and the guarantees of consistent, 
transparent, and equitable application to all claimants. The GCCF, 
for all its efforts to rapidly provide compensation to an astounding 
number of claimants in a streamlined, low-cost process, could not 
measure up to the class action settlement’s ability to deliver 
finality—even at a greater cost—in a fair and equitable manner. In 
the end, the public dispute resolution system proved more effective 
in serving the public interest in effective dispute resolution. 
 
AFTERWORD 
 
This Article uses the huge BP settlement of claims for economic 
harm following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill to illustrate a point 
about the advantages offered by public dispute resolution. We set 
about to address the paradox of why parties might find the 
apparently higher cost use of the litigation forum to provide more 
efficient closure than private agreements with apparently lower 
transaction costs. As this Article goes to press, the amicable 
resolution of the private economic claims has broken down into 
acrimonious charges over the scope of the business claims outside of 
the immediate proximity to the Gulf that should be covered by the 
settlement, as well as charges of misbehavior in the settlement 
administration. 
While perhaps unfortunate for the parties involved, the post-
settlement disputes do not alter the basic inquiry of this Article. The 
current disputes are about the boundaries of the settlement. Whatever 
those boundaries may ultimately prove to be, the parties entered into a 
resolution of litigation that proved more comprehensive and more 
generous than that afforded by the GCCF under OPA’s mandate of 
quick, informal claim resolution. That the once-unified settling parties 
subsequently had a falling out only makes the story more intriguing. 
As Leo Tolstoy once noted of what makes human drama interesting, 
“All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its 
own way.”105 
                                                                                                             
 105. LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (Richard Pevear & Larissa 
Volokhonsky trans., Viking Penguin 2001) (1886). 
